Following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran’s military infrastructure, much of the Arab world—including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the UAE, Kuwait, Morocco—publicly aligned with the action. The Houthis condemned the strike as “an attack on all Muslims,” but signaled Iran could respond without their military involvement. Russia and China issued denunciations, yet neither moved to assist Tehran.
What happens next? Ilan Berman will discuss:
<ul>
<li class="p1">What is the United States seeking to achieve—and what will that require?</li>
<li class="p1">How stable is Iran’s internal political order, and what role could the opposition play?</li>
<li class="p1">What does the regional outlook look like? Is Tehran attempting to widen the war—and what could follow?</li>
</ul>
Ilan Berman is Senior Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council and an expert on Middle East and Iran policy. He has consulted for U.S. government agencies and written and edited several books on regional security, including Dismantling Tyranny: Transitioning Beyond Totalitarian Regimes and Taking on Tehran: Strategies for Confronting the Islamic Republic.

<description>&lt;p class="p1"&gt;Following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran’s military infrastructure, much of the Arab world—including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the UAE, Kuwait, Morocco—publicly aligned with the action. The Houthis condemned the strike as “an attack on all Muslims,” but signaled Iran could respond without their military involvement. Russia and China issued denunciations, yet neither moved to assist Tehran.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What happens next? Ilan Berman will discuss:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li class="p1"&gt;What is the United States seeking to achieve—and what will that require?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li class="p1"&gt;How stable is Iran’s internal political order, and what role could the opposition play?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li class="p1"&gt;What does the regional outlook look like? Is Tehran attempting to widen the war—and what could follow?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ilan Berman is Senior Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council and an expert on Middle East and Iran policy. He has consulted for U.S. government agencies and written and edited several books on regional security, including &lt;em&gt;Dismantling Tyranny: Transitioning Beyond Totalitarian Regimes&lt;/em&gt; and &lt;em&gt;Taking on Tehran: Strategies for Confronting the Islamic Republic.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description>

Following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran’s military infrastructure, much of the Arab world—including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the UAE, Kuwait, Morocco—publicly aligned with the action. The Houthis condemned the strike as “an attack on all Muslims,” but si

Following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran’s military infrastructure, much of the Arab world—including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the UAE, Kuwait, Morocco—publicly aligned with the action. The Houthis condemned the strike as “an attack on all Muslims,” but signaled Iran could respond without their military involvement. Russia and China issued denunciations, yet neither moved to assist Tehran.
What happens next? Ilan Berman will discuss:

What is the United States seeking to achieve—and what will that require?
How stable is Iran’s internal political order, and what role could the opposition play?
What does the regional outlook look like? Is Tehran attempting to widen the war—and what could follow?

Ilan Berman is Senior Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council and an expert on Middle East and Iran policy. He has consulted for U.S. government agencies and written and edited several books on regional security, including Dismantling Tyranny: Transitioning Beyond Totalitarian Regimes and Taking on Tehran: Strategies for Confronting the Islamic Republic.

US Strikes Iran – What’s Next for the Middle East?

International law involving armed conflict has been &#8220;dead&#8221; in public perception since before the first shots were fired on October 7th. A community of humanitarian activists, academics, and NGOs has long presented a version of the law that &#8220;doesn&#8217;t connect with and doesn&#8217;t align with the doctrinal version of the law that we apply in practice,&#8221; Professor Brian Cox told a Jewish Policy Center webinar on Feb. 26. Truth may be the well-known first casualty of war, but law precedes it — distorted before conflicts even begin.
Cox, an adjunct professor at Cornell University Law School and a 22-year U.S. Army veteran, served seven years as a judge advocate with combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. His roles included military prosecutor, federal prosecutor, brigade judge advocate, and military magistrate. That background, he said, reveals a stark &#8220;divergence&#8221; between the law as military practitioners apply it and the version the humanitarian community generates in public discourse. Military lawyers advise commanders and train soldiers — &#8220;it&#8217;s not really our job to get thoroughly involved with public discourse.&#8221; The humanitarian community fills that vacuum.
He pointed to United Nations General Assembly resolutions as a prime example. While the General Assembly offers &#8220;absolutely virtuous qualities&#8221; as a diplomatic forum, it &#8220;cannot create international law&#8221; and its resolutions carry &#8220;no legal consequence.&#8221; Yet those pursuing an anti-Israel agenda exploit resolutions accumulated since the early 1970s to &#8220;create the perception as though the United Nations has said this is law and every country now has to follow.&#8221;
On the genocide charge, Cox was direct: &#8220;The focus always has to be intent. Intent is decisive.&#8221; From Raphael Lemkin&#8217;s original formulation through the 1948 Genocide Convention to the 1998 Rome Statute, intent has remained the linchpin. &#8220;It&#8217;s not like there&#8217;s a lot of destruction, but we&#8217;re not sure about the intent, but it&#8217;s still genocide. Intent is decisive.&#8221;
Israel&#8217;s expressed strategic objective has been consistent throughout: ensure Hamas no longer poses a threat and repatriate all hostages. To establish genocide, one would have to prove the actual intent is to destroy the Palestinian Arab population — not Hamas. Those advancing the allegation, he said, use a methodology &#8220;like clockwork&#8221;:
<ul>
<li>Cherry-pick statements from select Israeli political leaders and impute genocidal intent</li>
<li>Point to battlefield effects as confirmation</li>
<li>Downplay or ignore evidence of mitigation measures taken to protect civilians</li>
</ul>
He cited a concrete example. When the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) identified an underground Hamas command node beneath a hospital, they &#8220;deliberately delayed the fuses of these munitions so that the munitions would penetrate through the ground and explode underneath&#8221; rather than destroy the hospital above. &#8220;If the intent were to destroy the Palestinian population in whole or in part as such, there would be no need&#8221; for such measures.
On disproportionate force, Cox provided the doctrinal standard: &#8220;An attack is prohibited if the expected incidental damage is going to be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected.&#8221; Key points:
<ul>
<li>The assessment must be made per attack — each individual act of violence</li>
<li>It requires knowledge of what the responsible personnel expected at the time</li>
<li>Without that evidence, &#8220;we don&#8217;t have enough information to make a proportionality assessment&#8221;</li>
</ul>
In 22 years of service, he said, &#8220;I can&#8217;t think of a single scenario where a commander said, I expect incidental damage that&#8217;s going to be excessive, and I&#8217;m going to launch the attack anyways.&#8221; He criticized Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch for a &#8220;flawed methodology&#8221; — visiting attack sites after the fact, finding no visible evidence of military objectives, and concluding disproportionality without access to decision-makers&#8217; intent or intelligence.
The volume of misinformation, he acknowledged, amounts to a &#8220;flood&#8221; that overwhelms the few voices committed to doctrinal accuracy. Those who understand military doctrine &#8220;are too few and far between.&#8221; The best approach: &#8220;Keep chipping away at it to create an anchor for other folks who are interested in the truth to grab onto.&#8221;
Looking ahead, there is no legal obligation to rebuild Gaza before the conflict is resolved — and sound policy argues against it. The administration&#8217;s peace plan, including the proposed International Stabilization Force (ISF), represents &#8220;a generational opportunity to completely change the nature of this conflict that has been dragging out since the late 1940s.&#8221; But the international community &#8220;is going to have to put their troops where their mouths are&#8221; and use armed force against Hamas if necessary. &#8220;If that commitment isn&#8217;t there,&#8221; Cox cautioned, &#8220;my assessment is this won&#8217;t work. It&#8217;s just going to be a piece of paper.&#8221;
This summary was created with the help of AI, it may contain errors.

<description>&lt;p&gt;International law involving armed conflict has been &amp;#8220;dead&amp;#8221; in public perception since before the first shots were fired on October 7th. A community of humanitarian activists, academics, and NGOs has long presented a version of the law that &amp;#8220;doesn&amp;#8217;t connect with and doesn&amp;#8217;t align with the doctrinal version of the law that we apply in practice,&amp;#8221; Professor Brian Cox told a Jewish Policy Center webinar on Feb. 26. Truth may be the well-known first casualty of war, but law precedes it — distorted before conflicts even begin.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Cox, an adjunct professor at Cornell University Law School and a 22-year U.S. Army veteran, served seven years as a judge advocate with combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. His roles included military prosecutor, federal prosecutor, brigade judge advocate, and military magistrate. That background, he said, reveals a stark &amp;#8220;divergence&amp;#8221; between the law as military practitioners apply it and the version the humanitarian community generates in public discourse. Military lawyers advise commanders and train soldiers — &amp;#8220;it&amp;#8217;s not really our job to get thoroughly involved with public discourse.&amp;#8221; The humanitarian community fills that vacuum.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;He pointed to United Nations General Assembly resolutions as a prime example. While the General Assembly offers &amp;#8220;absolutely virtuous qualities&amp;#8221; as a diplomatic forum, it &amp;#8220;cannot create international law&amp;#8221; and its resolutions carry &amp;#8220;no legal consequence.&amp;#8221; Yet those pursuing an anti-Israel agenda exploit resolutions accumulated since the early 1970s to &amp;#8220;create the perception as though the United Nations has said this is law and every country now has to follow.&amp;#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On the genocide charge, Cox was direct: &amp;#8220;The focus always has to be intent. Intent is decisive.&amp;#8221; From Raphael Lemkin&amp;#8217;s original formulation through the 1948 Genocide Convention to the 1998 Rome Statute, intent has remained the linchpin. &amp;#8220;It&amp;#8217;s not like there&amp;#8217;s a lot of destruction, but we&amp;#8217;re not sure about the intent, but it&amp;#8217;s still genocide. Intent is decisive.&amp;#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Israel&amp;#8217;s expressed strategic objective has been consistent throughout: ensure Hamas no longer poses a threat and repatriate all hostages. To establish genocide, one would have to prove the actual intent is to destroy the Palestinian Arab population — not Hamas. Those advancing the allegation, he said, use a methodology &amp;#8220;like clockwork&amp;#8221;:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Cherry-pick statements from select Israeli political leaders and impute genocidal intent&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Point to battlefield effects as confirmation&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Downplay or ignore evidence of mitigation measures taken to protect civilians&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;He cited a concrete example. When the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) identified an underground Hamas command node beneath a hospital, they &amp;#8220;deliberately delayed the fuses of these munitions so that the munitions would penetrate through the ground and explode underneath&amp;#8221; rather than destroy the hospital above. &amp;#8220;If the intent were to destroy the Palestinian population in whole or in part as such, there would be no need&amp;#8221; for such measures.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On disproportionate force, Cox provided the doctrinal standard: &amp;#8220;An attack is prohibited if the expected incidental damage is going to be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected.&amp;#8221; Key points:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The assessment must be made per attack — each individual act of violence&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;It requires knowledge of what the responsible personnel expected at the time&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Without that evidence, &amp;#8220;we don&amp;#8217;t have enough information to make a proportionality assessment&amp;#8221;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In 22 years of service, he said, &amp;#8220;I can&amp;#8217;t think of a single scenario where a commander said, I expect incidental damage that&amp;#8217;s going to be excessive, and I&amp;#8217;m going to launch the attack anyways.&amp;#8221; He criticized Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch for a &amp;#8220;flawed methodology&amp;#8221; — visiting attack sites after the fact, finding no visible evidence of military objectives, and concluding disproportionality without access to decision-makers&amp;#8217; intent or intelligence.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The volume of misinformation, he acknowledged, amounts to a &amp;#8220;flood&amp;#8221; that overwhelms the few voices committed to doctrinal accuracy. Those who understand military doctrine &amp;#8220;are too few and far between.&amp;#8221; The best approach: &amp;#8220;Keep chipping away at it to create an anchor for other folks who are interested in the truth to grab onto.&amp;#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Looking ahead, there is no legal obligation to rebuild Gaza before the conflict is resolved — and sound policy argues against it. The administration&amp;#8217;s peace plan, including the proposed International Stabilization Force (ISF), represents &amp;#8220;a generational opportunity to completely change the nature of this conflict that has been dragging out since the late 1940s.&amp;#8221; But the international community &amp;#8220;is going to have to put their troops where their mouths are&amp;#8221; and use armed force against Hamas if necessary. &amp;#8220;If that commitment isn&amp;#8217;t there,&amp;#8221; Cox cautioned, &amp;#8220;my assessment is this won&amp;#8217;t work. It&amp;#8217;s just going to be a piece of paper.&amp;#8221;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;This summary was created with the help of AI, it may contain errors. &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description>

International law involving armed conflict has been &#8220;dead&#8221; in public perception since before the first shots were fired on October 7th. A community of humanitarian activists, academics, and NGOs has long presented a version of the law that &#

International law involving armed conflict has been &#8220;dead&#8221; in public perception since before the first shots were fired on October 7th. A community of humanitarian activists, academics, and NGOs has long presented a version of the law that &#8220;doesn&#8217;t connect with and doesn&#8217;t align with the doctrinal version of the law that we apply in practice,&#8221; Professor Brian Cox told a Jewish Policy Center webinar on Feb. 26. Truth may be the well-known first casualty of war, but law precedes it — distorted before conflicts even begin.
Cox, an adjunct professor at Cornell University Law School and a 22-year U.S. Army veteran, served seven years as a judge advocate with combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. His roles included military prosecutor, federal prosecutor, brigade judge advocate, and military magistrate. That background, he said, reveals a stark &#8220;divergence&#8221; between the law as military practitioners apply it and the version the humanitarian community generates in public discourse. Military lawyers advise commanders and train soldiers — &#8220;it&#8217;s not really our job to get thoroughly involved with public discourse.&#8221; The humanitarian community fills that vacuum.
He pointed to United Nations General Assembly resolutions as a prime example. While the General Assembly offers &#8220;absolutely virtuous qualities&#8221; as a diplomatic forum, it &#8220;cannot create international law&#8221; and its resolutions carry &#8220;no legal consequence.&#8221; Yet those pursuing an anti-Israel agenda exploit resolutions accumulated since the early 1970s to &#8220;create the perception as though the United Nations has said this is law and every country now has to follow.&#8221;
On the genocide charge, Cox was direct: &#8220;The focus always has to be intent. Intent is decisive.&#8221; From Raphael Lemkin&#8217;s original formulation through the 1948 Genocide Convention to the 1998 Rome Statute, intent has remained the linchpin. &#8220;It&#8217;s not like there&#8217;s a lot of destruction, but we&#8217;re not sure about the intent, but it&#8217;s still genocide. Intent is decisive.&#8221;
Israel&#8217;s expressed strategic objective has been consistent throughout: ensure Hamas no longer poses a threat and repatriate all hostages. To establish genocide, one would have to prove the actual intent is to destroy the Palestinian Arab population — not Hamas. Those advancing the allegation, he said, use a methodology &#8220;like clockwork&#8221;:

Cherry-pick statements from select Israeli political leaders and impute genocidal intent
Point to battlefield effects as confirmation
Downplay or ignore evidence of mitigation measures taken to protect civilians

He cited a concrete example. When the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) identified an underground Hamas command node beneath a hospital, they &#8220;deliberately delayed the fuses of these munitions so that the munitions would penetrate through the ground and explode underneath&#8221; rather than destroy the hospital above. &#8220;If the intent were to destroy the Palestinian population in whole or in part as such, there would be no need&#8221; for such measures.
On disproportionate force, Cox provided the doctrinal standard: &#8220;An attack is prohibited if the expected incidental damage is going to be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected.&#8221; Key points:

The assessment must be made per attack — each individual act of violence
It requires knowledge of what the responsible personnel expected at the time
Without that evidence, &#8220;we don&#8217;t have enough information to make a proportionality assessment&#8221;

In 22 years of service, he said, &#8220;I can&#8217;t think of a single scenario where a commander said, I expect incidental damage that&#8217;s going to be excessive, and I&#8217;m going to launch the attack anyways.&#8221; He criticized Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch for a &

Doctrine vs Discourse – International Law and the Gaza War

Immigration policy and law enforcement sit at the center of today’s most contentious national debates—often generating more heat than clarity.
Steven Pomerantz, Assistant Director of the FBI (ret.), a veteran of federal counterterrorism and criminal investigations, joins us to provide a structured look at the issue:
<ul>
<li>How we got here – the statutory foundation of U.S. immigration law</li>
<li>Where we stand now – enforcement challenges, federal–state dynamics, and judicial bottlenecks</li>
<li>What comes next – practical approaches that uphold civil rights and public safety.</li>
</ul>

<description>&lt;p&gt;Immigration policy and law enforcement sit at the center of today’s most contentious national debates—often generating more heat than clarity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Steven Pomerantz, Assistant Director of the FBI (ret.), a veteran of federal counterterrorism and criminal investigations, joins us to provide a structured look at the issue:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;How we got here – the statutory foundation of U.S. immigration law&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Where we stand now – enforcement challenges, federal–state dynamics, and judicial bottlenecks&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;What comes next – practical approaches that uphold civil rights and public safety.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;</description>

Immigration policy and law enforcement sit at the center of today’s most contentious national debates—often generating more heat than clarity.
Steven Pomerantz, Assistant Director of the FBI (ret.), a veteran of federal counterterrorism and criminal inve

Immigration policy and law enforcement sit at the center of today’s most contentious national debates—often generating more heat than clarity.
Steven Pomerantz, Assistant Director of the FBI (ret.), a veteran of federal counterterrorism and criminal investigations, joins us to provide a structured look at the issue:

How we got here – the statutory foundation of U.S. immigration law
Where we stand now – enforcement challenges, federal–state dynamics, and judicial bottlenecks
What comes next – practical approaches that uphold civil rights and public safety.

Federalism and Immigration Enforcement   

In this webinar, Middle East analyst Hussain Abdul-Hussain argues that Saudi Arabia’s recent retreat from normalization with Israel reflects a deeper strategic reversal driven by economic strain and geopolitical recalculation. What once appeared to be a reformist trajectory under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has, in his assessment, stalled—and the response has been a return to populism and state-managed Islamism.
Hussain grounds his analysis in economic reality. Saudi Arabia’s oil-based model, he explains, can no longer sustain a rapidly growing population amid global oversupply and depressed prices. The kingdom requires far higher oil prices to balance its budget, yet the market has not delivered. Meanwhile, high-profile diversification projects have failed to generate meaningful returns. As fiscal pressure increases, Saudi leadership has reverted to familiar political tools. As Hussain puts it, “When governments realize they cannot fix problems structurally, they revert to populism. And populism needs enemies.”
That shift, he argues, explains the resurgence of anti-American and antisemitic rhetoric across Saudi media, religious sermons, and social platforms—channels he emphasizes are tightly controlled and reflect official policy rather than rogue opinion. This rhetoric marks a sharp departure from the language of reform and regional cooperation that characterized Saudi messaging only a short time ago.
On Israel, Hussain contends that the strategic logic has changed. After Israel’s conflict with Iran weakened Tehran’s regional position, Saudi Arabia no longer views Israel as a necessary counterweight to Iranian power. That reduced threat perception weakened one of the main incentives for normalization. At the same time, he argues that Saudi leadership continues to misunderstand the nature of peace with Israel, treating it as a concession rather than a mutually beneficial economic decision. Saudi Arabia still thinks peace with Israel is a reward to Israel, they don’t understand that it’s a reward to themselves.
Several themes recur throughout the discussion:
<ul>
<li>Economic stress as the primary driver: Oil revenues are no longer sufficient, diversification has underperformed, and fiscal pressure is growing.</li>
<li>Populism as a fallback strategy: With reform stalled, leadership has turned to ideological mobilization to deflect attention from domestic constraints.</li>
<li>Eroding trust in the United States: Inconsistent U.S. policy and abandoned regional partners have pushed Saudi Arabia to hedge rather than align.</li>
<li>A stark contrast with the UAE: The UAE’s diversification strategy and peace with Israel are presented as a durable, working model Saudi Arabia has not replicated.</li>
<li>Realignment toward Turkey and Qatar: Hussain argues that U.S. tolerance of Islamist regimes has encouraged Saudi Arabia’s ideological drift.</li>
</ul>
Throughout the webinar, Hussain repeatedly returns to the same conclusion: Saudi Arabia’s central vulnerability is economic, not military. Israel does not threaten the kingdom’s security—but stagnation does. As he summarizes, what should keep MBS awake at night is not Israel or Iran—it’s the Saudi economy.
Until Saudi leadership internalizes that reality—and recognizes normalization with Israel as an economic necessity rather than a political favor—Hussain sees little reason to expect a near-term course correction.
This summary was written with AI and could contain errors.

<description>&lt;p&gt;In this webinar, Middle East analyst Hussain Abdul-Hussain argues that Saudi Arabia’s recent retreat from normalization with Israel reflects a deeper strategic reversal driven by economic strain and geopolitical recalculation. What once appeared to be a reformist trajectory under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has, in his assessment, stalled—and the response has been a return to populism and state-managed Islamism.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Hussain grounds his analysis in economic reality. Saudi Arabia’s oil-based model, he explains, can no longer sustain a rapidly growing population amid global oversupply and depressed prices. The kingdom requires far higher oil prices to balance its budget, yet the market has not delivered. Meanwhile, high-profile diversification projects have failed to generate meaningful returns. As fiscal pressure increases, Saudi leadership has reverted to familiar political tools. As Hussain puts it, “When governments realize they cannot fix problems structurally, they revert to populism. And populism needs enemies.”&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That shift, he argues, explains the resurgence of anti-American and antisemitic rhetoric across Saudi media, religious sermons, and social platforms—channels he emphasizes are tightly controlled and reflect official policy rather than rogue opinion. This rhetoric marks a sharp departure from the language of reform and regional cooperation that characterized Saudi messaging only a short time ago.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On Israel, Hussain contends that the strategic logic has changed. After Israel’s conflict with Iran weakened Tehran’s regional position, Saudi Arabia no longer views Israel as a necessary counterweight to Iranian power. That reduced threat perception weakened one of the main incentives for normalization. At the same time, he argues that Saudi leadership continues to misunderstand the nature of peace with Israel, treating it as a concession rather than a mutually beneficial economic decision. Saudi Arabia still thinks peace with Israel is a reward to Israel, they don’t understand that it’s a reward to themselves.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Several themes recur throughout the discussion:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Economic stress as the primary driver: Oil revenues are no longer sufficient, diversification has underperformed, and fiscal pressure is growing.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Populism as a fallback strategy: With reform stalled, leadership has turned to ideological mobilization to deflect attention from domestic constraints.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Eroding trust in the United States: Inconsistent U.S. policy and abandoned regional partners have pushed Saudi Arabia to hedge rather than align.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;A stark contrast with the UAE: The UAE’s diversification strategy and peace with Israel are presented as a durable, working model Saudi Arabia has not replicated.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Realignment toward Turkey and Qatar: Hussain argues that U.S. tolerance of Islamist regimes has encouraged Saudi Arabia’s ideological drift.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Throughout the webinar, Hussain repeatedly returns to the same conclusion: Saudi Arabia’s central vulnerability is economic, not military. Israel does not threaten the kingdom’s security—but stagnation does. As he summarizes, what should keep MBS awake at night is not Israel or Iran—it’s the Saudi economy.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Until Saudi leadership internalizes that reality—and recognizes normalization with Israel as an economic necessity rather than a political favor—Hussain sees little reason to expect a near-term course correction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;This summary was written with AI and could contain errors. &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description>

In this webinar, Middle East analyst Hussain Abdul-Hussain argues that Saudi Arabia’s recent retreat from normalization with Israel reflects a deeper strategic reversal driven by economic strain and geopolitical recalculation. What once appeared to be a 

In this webinar, Middle East analyst Hussain Abdul-Hussain argues that Saudi Arabia’s recent retreat from normalization with Israel reflects a deeper strategic reversal driven by economic strain and geopolitical recalculation. What once appeared to be a reformist trajectory under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has, in his assessment, stalled—and the response has been a return to populism and state-managed Islamism.
Hussain grounds his analysis in economic reality. Saudi Arabia’s oil-based model, he explains, can no longer sustain a rapidly growing population amid global oversupply and depressed prices. The kingdom requires far higher oil prices to balance its budget, yet the market has not delivered. Meanwhile, high-profile diversification projects have failed to generate meaningful returns. As fiscal pressure increases, Saudi leadership has reverted to familiar political tools. As Hussain puts it, “When governments realize they cannot fix problems structurally, they revert to populism. And populism needs enemies.”
That shift, he argues, explains the resurgence of anti-American and antisemitic rhetoric across Saudi media, religious sermons, and social platforms—channels he emphasizes are tightly controlled and reflect official policy rather than rogue opinion. This rhetoric marks a sharp departure from the language of reform and regional cooperation that characterized Saudi messaging only a short time ago.
On Israel, Hussain contends that the strategic logic has changed. After Israel’s conflict with Iran weakened Tehran’s regional position, Saudi Arabia no longer views Israel as a necessary counterweight to Iranian power. That reduced threat perception weakened one of the main incentives for normalization. At the same time, he argues that Saudi leadership continues to misunderstand the nature of peace with Israel, treating it as a concession rather than a mutually beneficial economic decision. Saudi Arabia still thinks peace with Israel is a reward to Israel, they don’t understand that it’s a reward to themselves.
Several themes recur throughout the discussion:

Economic stress as the primary driver: Oil revenues are no longer sufficient, diversification has underperformed, and fiscal pressure is growing.
Populism as a fallback strategy: With reform stalled, leadership has turned to ideological mobilization to deflect attention from domestic constraints.
Eroding trust in the United States: Inconsistent U.S. policy and abandoned regional partners have pushed Saudi Arabia to hedge rather than align.
A stark contrast with the UAE: The UAE’s diversification strategy and peace with Israel are presented as a durable, working model Saudi Arabia has not replicated.
Realignment toward Turkey and Qatar: Hussain argues that U.S. tolerance of Islamist regimes has encouraged Saudi Arabia’s ideological drift.

Throughout the webinar, Hussain repeatedly returns to the same conclusion: Saudi Arabia’s central vulnerability is economic, not military. Israel does not threaten the kingdom’s security—but stagnation does. As he summarizes, what should keep MBS awake at night is not Israel or Iran—it’s the Saudi economy.
Until Saudi leadership internalizes that reality—and recognizes normalization with Israel as an economic necessity rather than a political favor—Hussain sees little reason to expect a near-term course correction.
This summary was written with AI and could contain errors. 

Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Reversal on Populism and Peace

Note: The body of Ran Gvili, the last hostage held in Gaza, was found by the soldiers of the IDF this morning while we were recording. It was with great relief that I took off my hostage pin. May HaShem bless the memory of Ran Gvili. Here, I believe, is the most poignant portrayal of the unwavering faith and loyalty that inspires Israel&#8217;s soldiers. <a href="https://x.com/i/status/2015787812155457931">https://x.com/i/status/2015787812155457931</a> 
While we were snowed in, we recorded this week&#8217;s JPC webinar and, assuming you are still snowed in as well, we are sending it to you today. Our guest was Dr. Mark Meirowitz, Professor of Humanities at SUNY Maritime College. As an expert on Turkey and Turkish foreign policy, he discussed Ankara&#8217;s role in Syria and its broader geopolitical implications. The conversation included historical and current regional power dynamics, including Turkey&#8217;s relationships with Israel (and Gaza), Cyprus, and other Middle Eastern countries.
Grab a cup of coffee and don&#8217;t even think about shoveling for a while.
Best, Shoshana

<description>&lt;p&gt;Note: The body of Ran Gvili, the last hostage held in Gaza, was found by the soldiers of the IDF this morning while we were recording. It was with great relief that I took off my hostage pin. May HaShem bless the memory of Ran Gvili. Here, I believe, is the most poignant portrayal of the unwavering faith and loyalty that inspires Israel&amp;#8217;s soldiers. &lt;a href="https://x.com/i/status/2015787812155457931"&gt;https://x.com/i/status/2015787812155457931&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While we were snowed in, we recorded this week&amp;#8217;s JPC webinar and, assuming you are still snowed in as well, we are sending it to you today. Our guest was Dr. Mark Meirowitz, Professor of Humanities at SUNY Maritime College. As an expert on Turkey and Turkish foreign policy, he discussed Ankara&amp;#8217;s role in Syria and its broader geopolitical implications. The conversation included historical and current regional power dynamics, including Turkey&amp;#8217;s relationships with Israel (and Gaza), Cyprus, and other Middle Eastern countries.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Grab a cup of coffee and don&amp;#8217;t even think about shoveling for a while.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Best, Shoshana&lt;/p&gt;</description>

Note: The body of Ran Gvili, the last hostage held in Gaza, was found by the soldiers of the IDF this morning while we were recording. It was with great relief that I took off my hostage pin. May HaShem bless the memory of Ran Gvili. Here, I believe, is 

Note: The body of Ran Gvili, the last hostage held in Gaza, was found by the soldiers of the IDF this morning while we were recording. It was with great relief that I took off my hostage pin. May HaShem bless the memory of Ran Gvili. Here, I believe, is the most poignant portrayal of the unwavering faith and loyalty that inspires Israel&#8217;s soldiers. https://x.com/i/status/2015787812155457931 
While we were snowed in, we recorded this week&#8217;s JPC webinar and, assuming you are still snowed in as well, we are sending it to you today. Our guest was Dr. Mark Meirowitz, Professor of Humanities at SUNY Maritime College. As an expert on Turkey and Turkish foreign policy, he discussed Ankara&#8217;s role in Syria and its broader geopolitical implications. The conversation included historical and current regional power dynamics, including Turkey&#8217;s relationships with Israel (and Gaza), Cyprus, and other Middle Eastern countries.
Grab a cup of coffee and don&#8217;t even think about shoveling for a while.
Best, Shoshana

Turkey’s Ascendance in the New Middle East

The Jewish Policy Center, a 501c(3) non-profit organization, provides timely perspectives and analysis of foreign and domestic policies by leading scholars, academics, and commentators.

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