<p>Samuel Seitz, a fellow at MIT’s Security Studies Program, explores so-called “madman behavior” in international politics and whether it’s effective in gaining leverage in international confrontations. He explains why problems of signaling, credibility, and reassurance tend to make madman tactics ineffective and he discusses examples from the Cold War to Trump’s first and second administrations.&nbsp;</p><br><p><strong>Show Notes</strong></p><br><p>Samuel Seitz, Caitlin Talmadge, “<a href="https://bpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/1/2181/files/2024/12/SeitzTalmadge_TWQ.pdf" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">The Predictable Hazards of Unpredictability: Why Madman Behavior Doesn’t Work</a>,” <em>The Washington Quarterly</em> 43:3, 2020.&nbsp;</p><hr><p style='color:grey; font-size:0.75em;'> Hosted on Acast. See <a style='color:grey;' target='_blank' rel='noopener noreferrer' href='https://acast.com/privacy'>acast.com/privacy</a> for more information.</p>