China’s Real Estate: Debt Crisis and Developer Challenges

In past years, local governments, aiming for infrastructure development, struck deals with developers allowing them to obtain land at lower prices. The catch was that developers would help the local governments with infrastructure like building bridges, roads, schools, hospitals, and shopping centers. After completion, developers would also assist in attracting investment. For a time, this symbiotic relationship blossomed in a mutual honeymoon phase.

However, as local economies began to improve, many local governments seemed to turn on their developer partners, suggesting they complete infrastructure projects before discussing land approvals. Unfortunately, after the developers fulfilled their end, land approvals were sometimes denied for various reasons, leaving many developers aggrieved but mostly silent.

The construction industry inherently has a long capital turnover cycle, sometimes taking 5-6 years for full repayment. Meanwhile, expenses for labor, materials, and sales persist, creating significant financial pressure. A strategy devised by developers was to mortgage their constructed properties to banks. Once the property was sold, homeowners would repay the bank. Interestingly, many homeowners financed their purchases with bank loans, meaning the bank technically owned the property throughout the process.

Developers realized under this scheme they didn’t have to worry about sales — they simply had to mortgage properties to gain funds. With house prices continuously rising, developers could keep building, ensuring a steady cash flow, and then invest these funds in high-return ventures.

There were even incidents where developers hired actors to create a façade of booming sales at property sites, aiming to convince both potential buyers and banks of the property’s attractiveness.

With house prices skyrocketing across China, even in third and fourth-tier cities, property prices often surpassed local incomes. The phenomenon of “locals can’t afford local homes” became widely discussed.

The decree “Houses are for living in, not for speculation” signaled the start of real estate regulation, with various measures introduced to control property prices and loans. The market soon responded with a cooldown. Local governments tightened land approval processes, from a “villa restriction order” to an outright “villa ban”, followed by restrictions on high-rise plots, all aiming to curb the wild and chaotic expansion of real estate.

Soon after, the central bank and the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development issued financing policies for developers, effective from January 1, 2021. These were the so-called “three red lines”:

1. An asset-liability ratio greater than 70% after deducting advance receipts.
2. A net debt ratio exceeding 100%.
3. A cash-to-short-term debt ratio below 1.

By mid-2023, the 12 pilot real estate companies had to meet all these “three red line” standards, with all companies expected to comply by the end of 2023.

Evergrande hit all these red lines, making debt reduction its top priority. Various measures were taken, from asset sales, divestments in cultural sectors, debt-to-equity swaps, to other forms of financing. But these actions only exposed the colossal financial black hole, a shocking $300 billion debt, which alarmed the global community given its potential to trigger a worldwide financial crisis. Yet, there was an unusual consensus among foreign media and investors: “China can handle the Evergrande situation”.

So far, there’s no clear sign of the state intervening. The message seems clear to corporate giants: “No company is too big to fail”. Controlling financial risks has become a lesson that Chinese enterprises must heed.

The golden age for the real estate industry seems to be waning. The era where property developers leveraged financial gains for rapid growth no longer exists.

Beyond the above, city investment bonds (often referred to as “城投债” or “City Investment Bonds”) have also become a topic of concern. These bonds, mainly issued by local government financing platforms (LGFVs), have played a pivotal role in fueling China’s urbanization drive over the past few decades.

There’s a close relationship between developers like Country Garden and city investment platforms. For instance, Country Garden might buy land from these platforms or collaborate with them for development. This means that when these platforms face financial risks, developers like Country Garden are directly impacted.

To combat these risks, many developers, including Country Garden, are searching for new partnership models and funding sources. But, clearly, this isn’t an issue that can be resolved overnight. This implies that China’s real estate market might face a prolonged period of adjustment and change.

All the content above represents personal opinions. Some information is sourced from the internet. Please contact the author for any copyright or regulatory concerns.

互联网巨头的容器战略及其焦虑

随着科技的迅速进步，如今我们手机上的应用已经不再单一。许多应用现在都采用的是Hybird App的架构。这种模式结合了 Native 的基础功能和 Webview + JS Bridge 的快速变化的内容。在这种模式下，Webview 的渲染性能就显得尤为关键，因为它直接决定了用户的使用体验。

看到这样的趋势，各大互联网公司都开始重视浏览器内核的研发和收购。例如，阿里收购了 UC 浏览器，并利用了 UC 的内核。腾讯则拥有 X5 内核，并且后续还收购了搜狗浏览器。字节跳动也不甘落后，他们也在积极布局开发自己的浏览器内核，基于 webkit 的技术。而美团虽然从商业角度支持了小程序的架构，但由于缺乏自己的浏览器内核，它一直面临着巨大的挑战。

为了解决这个问题，美团开始了自己的浏览器内核研发工作。他们曾试图 fork webkit，但由于其庞大的 codebase，这个项目进展缓慢。后来，当React Native技术问世，美团决定投资 MRN 架构，期望通过这种方式优化移动端的渲染体验。但很快，由于社区对 React Native 技术性能的质疑，以及其无法解决的固有问题，美团逐渐转向 Flutter 架构。

我的个人经历也与此相关。我最初专注于工程化方案的研究，但后来我被分配到小程序架构的团队，然后再到 Flutter 渲染引擎的项目中。我们的目标是基于 skia 来解析 DOM 和 CSS，从而实现一个高效的渲染引擎。这项工作仍在进行中。

与此同时，React Native 的原生绑定模式对许多开发者来说也是一个挑战。很多前端开发者在尝试学习React Native时发现，由于其底层是基于 Native 的实现，导致许多功能需要先在 Native 中实现，React Native 才能调用。这也使得 React Native 无法真正实现“多端一致性”的目标。

而 Flutter，是 Google 提出的一个解决方案。不同于 React Native，Flutter 直接使用 skia（基于 OpenGL）从头构建渲染引擎，避免了操作系统层面的交互。这种做法使得Flutter能够真正实现一套代码在多端运行。

综上，从架构的特点和前景来看，Flutter 显然更具投资价值。但这并不意味着它现在就是完美的。例如，“闲鱼”App，尽管是基于 Flutter 开发的，但在实际使用中，其稳定性和性能仍有待提高。

总的来说，随着技术的发展，各大互联网公司在容器技术方面的布局和策略也在不断调整。未来还有很长的路要走，但这也充满了机会和挑战。

我眼中的前端技术发展方向

一、React 没有未来

React 解决了什么问题？

• 组件化的问题
• 引入了虚拟 DOM 优化渲染

组件化的问题 Web Component 已经在路上了，终将有一个标准化的实现。

我们知道，VirtualDOM 可以一定程度上优化 DOM 渲染性能，但是在浏览器层面上 DOM 渲染性能本身就已经在优化了，React 中使用 VirtualDOM 来优化性能问题，这个问题很大程度上是 React 自己造成的。浏览器本身 DOM 性能已经很高了。当然我们也要知道 React VirtualDOM 不只是为了解决渲染问题，也为了能够实现渲染层抽象，适配更多的渲染引擎。

二、Webpack 没有未来

我们之所以使用 Webpack 来打包主要是解决两个问题：

• 模块化
• 合并文件以降低创建网络链接对页面加载性能的影响

随着 HTTP/2/3/QUIC 的发展，连接复用技术已经可以实现，即使在页面上写多个相同域的多个 script 标签也只会创建一个 TCP 链接，而且支持交叉数据传递，对网络加载性能影响很小。

目前很多 CDN 厂商都已经部署了 HTTP/2（\w QUIC）协议，毕竟对他们来说也是一个节省开销的好事情。

其次，浏览器对于 ES Module 已经支持的很好了，而且从社区支持来看越来越多的 Library 都输出了符合 ESM 规范的打包格式。而且 ESM 相比于其他打包格式还有一些诸如减少JS VM 虚拟机计算量等额外优势，没有理由不支持。

没有了 Webpack TypeScript 怎么办？

如果没有了 Webpack，那么 TypeScript 可以通过 WebAssembly 在浏览器端解析和执行，无需预编译执行。

三、小程序没有未来

虽然目前小程序已经很流行，但是 Service Worker 和 Offline App 的广泛应用是迟早的事情。

小程序总是想着向 Native 的方向努力，最终很可能会变成 Native 开发的一种方式，而非 Web 的未来。

虽然小程序为开发者提供了一种简单、快速的开发方式，但它并没有实现重大创新。

我眼中的未来是什么？

回归标准：我在讲某个东西没有未来并不是说否定它存在的意义，在特定的时期下它们的存在是非常重要的，它们加速了 Web 发展进程功不可没，但是缺乏标准化总是在解决一个问题的同时带来了非常多衍生的其他问题，这就是工程化实践和标准化实践的区别。

大道至简：想想看，我们现在要开始做一个 Web 应用要做那些事情？安装一大堆的框架、工具库、工具链、打包编译工具，每修改一个文件都要等待漫长的编译，每次发布都要经过复杂的工作流程来确保与开发时的预期一致。我认为未来不是这样，就应该是开箱即用，唾手可得，且性能优异。

Clubhouse: An audio-driven social haven

At its core, Clubhouse is an audio-centric social platform. Its users can be broadly classified as:

• Moderators: The drivers of conversations
• Speakers: The participants voicing their opinions
• Listeners: The silent majority who absorb the discourse

In terms of its product structure, Clubhouse resonates with traditional radio broadcasts, contemporary Podcasts, and teleconferences. However, it sets itself apart by allowing users to engage in real-time discussions on a plethora of topics or none at all.

Interestingly, once a moderator ends a conversation and exits the room, it’s as if the discussion never happened; no recordings, no screen captures—a ‘snap-and-disappear’ essence. This ephemeral nature fosters open and burden-free communication.

Insight One: Clubhouse is not a technological marvel

Technologically speaking, Clubhouse wasn’t a pioneer in audio-social platforms. Platforms like Talkbox and YY had tread this path almost a decade ago. What’s more, indie developers even managed to recreate similar platforms on Twitter in a mere 60 hours! This suggests that Clubhouse’s popularity isn’t necessarily rooted in technological advancement.

Insight Two: Its lack of niche is its niche

The true essence of Clubhouse’s success lies in the ambiance it creates. Some equate it to a local tea house or a communal gathering under an old village tree. What makes it unique? In truth, not much. However, this absence of a specific niche, unlike platforms like YY or Twitch, makes it versatile for an array of topics.

Currently exclusive to the iOS ecosystem and absent from the Chinese App Store due to content regulations, Clubhouse employs an invite-only model. This fosters a tight-knit community. The app’s core attributes reveal:

• Rooms: Crafted around friendships or specific topics, rooms are algorithmically recommended to acquaintances or familiar faces, ensuring discussions remain intact without unexpected interruptions.

• Voice-Centric Approach: Unlike text, voice feels warmer; unlike video, it rids the stress of appearance. The absence of recordings generates a laid-back, equal-footed, and spontaneous discussion environment.

Insight Three: Why did Clubhouse resonate in China?

Despite the barriers to entry (acquiring an App Store US account, purchasing invites), the app has managed to carve a niche as an “elite community” in China. Most users wouldn’t expend so much effort for a mere social app. But, Clubhouse, catering to a global audience, offers a window to the world—a tantalizing proposition for a curious Chinese populace.

Recently, rooms discussing cross-strait relations have surged. Given the long-standing information gap and misconceptions fueled by media on both sides, direct voice dialogues offer a more reasoned and respectful medium of engagement.

In a nutshell, Clubhouse’s rise can be attributed to:

• Origins: Meeting basic human needs; gathering and conversing are essential emotional outlets.

• Circumstance: The pandemic inhibited physical gatherings, amplifying this need.

• Trigger: Elon Musk’s live session on Clubhouse spurred a monumental traffic surge.

• User Experience: A clear and intuitive interface centered around its core function.

• Ambiance: Its initial traction within venture capital, product, and crypto circles cultivated an elite community vibe.

These insights represent personal opinions and are open for discussion. Engage away! 👏