Lomdus On The Amud: Following The Oraysa Schedule

החקירה:האם איסורי נזיר מוגדרים כדין השוה בכל — דומיא דנדרים המחייבים כל אדם לשמור את מוצא שפתיו —אושהם דינים הנובעים מ“שם תואר” של נזיר, ואינם שייכים אלא למי שחלה עליו קדושת נזירות?---The Core QuestionThe sugya depends on defining the very nature of Nazirus:> Is Nazirus fundamentally like a neder (a universal halachic mechanism)?Or is it a unique halachic status — a “shem toar” — that the Torah applies only to someone who assumes the role of a Nazir?This distinction determines whether Nazir prohibitions are considered “equal to all” (שוה בכל) or “not equal to all” (אינו שוה בכל).---Side A – Nazirus is like a Neder (Issur Cheftza or Issur Gavra)According to the Mahar"i Ben Lev and Mahar"i Basan:When a person accepts Nazirus, he is creating an issur, either:On the object (wine becomes forbidden), orOn the person (the person becomes prohibited from cutting hair or drinking wine).Result:The mechanism is the same mechanism as nedarim, which applies to everyone.Therefore, even those who never became Nazirīm are bound by the same underlying halachic system:→ Nazir prohibitions count as “שוה בכל.”---Side B – Nazirus is a Halachic Status (“Shem Teva”)According to the Mahariṭ:Nazirus is not an issur-object and not an issur-person in the neder sense.It is a new kedusha-status placed on a person:→ The Torah gives special prohibitions only to one who possesses this status.Result:These laws apply only to people with that status.Therefore:→ Nazir prohibitions are “אינו שוה בכל.”--

Yevamos 4b:גדר איסור כלאים: מעשה לבישה או הנאת לבישהThis episode analyzes the precise geder ha-issur of shaatnez: What, at its core, does the Torah prohibit? The Gemara establishes that shaatnez is forbidden only when there is both levishah and hana’ah, which creates a central chakirah: Is the prohibition fundamentally the benefit one receives from shaatnez, with wearing serving merely as the mechanism for that benefit? Or is the essence the act of wearing shaatnez, with the requirement of hana’ah simply defining which act of wearing rises to the level of issur?Rashi’s explanation suggests that hana’ah might be the central ingredient, and this has major implications for tzitzis. If mitzvos are not classified as personal enjoyment (mitzvos lav le’hanos nitnu), does that mean the prohibition of shaatnez never starts in a mitzvah setting? Or does the halachic act of levishah remain fully present, requiring a formal Torah-based allowance even when no physical pleasure is intended?

This episode lays out the fundamental chakirah in the sugya of עשה דוחה לא תעשה: when an aseh overrides a lav, what is the precise geder of that override?One model understands the mechanism as דחויה—the lav remains a full-fledged prohibition, but the aseh possesses greater halachic force and therefore pushes it aside (dacheihu) at the moment of conflict. The issur exists, but it is overridden due to the priority of kiyum aseh over shev v’al ta’aseh of the lav.The second model views the system as הותרה—that the lav simply does not apply (lo chal klal) in any situation where the Torah demands fulfillment of the competing aseh. According to this understanding, the Torah never spoke its lo sa’aseh in the context of a mitzvas aseh; the prohibition is absent rather than suppressed.This chakirah produces major nafka minos:• Whether we say aseh docheh lo sa’aseh even באפשר לקיים שניהם, if it is technically possible to satisfy both without conflict.• Whether one may lechatchilah create a situation that will require aseh docheh, or whether doing so improperly forces a dichuyah.• Whether, in cases of lav + aseh standing against an aseh (where the override cannot operate), the lav is still considered chal for malkus, or whether it is treated as nitcheh and therefore exempt from punishment.This section thus defines the underlying conceptual infrastructure of the rule: is aseh docheh lo sa’aseh an act of halachic force, where the mitzvah actively overrides, or an act of halachic definition, where the lav never attains status in that setting to begin with?

This episode presents Rav Akiva Eiger’s classic kasha on Tzaras Tzarah: why does the Torah require a special pasuk of “litzror” to asser the second co-wife? Once the first tzarah becomes Eishes Ach, she would seem to carry the full status of an ervah, and an ervah ordinarily extends its halachic effect to a co-wife automatically. What, then, necessitates a new pasuk?Rav Nachum’s yesod provides the framework: the halachos of yibbum operate within two distinct categories—issur and ptur mitzvah. An ervah does not merely forbid; she removes the mitzvah of yibbum and thereby creates a ptur that applies to her tzarah. Eishes Ach, however, is a pure issur—and precisely the issur overridden by yibbum. An issur of this type has no koach to generate a ptur for another woman.Accordingly, even when the first tzarah becomes Eishes Ach, she remains within the realm of issur and cannot affect her fellow co-wife. Without the pasuk, the Tzaras Tzarah would remain permitted. The pasuk is thus indispensable.This episode articulates Rav Akiva Eiger’s kasha and Rav Nachum’s yesod as two sides of the same structure, defining why only an ervah—through ptur—can extend to a tzarah, and why Eishes Ach cannot.

עיון ביסוד דין צרת ערוה, לבאר אם עיקרו מדין פטור מן היבום או שיסודו דין איסור שמחילה הערוה על צרתה, ולעמוד על מחלוקת הראשונים והגרי״ז בגדר החלות.