Cloud Security Podcast by Google
Cloud Security Podcast by Google

Cloud Security Podcast by Google

Anton Chuvakin

Overview
Episodes

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Cloud Security Podcast by Google focuses on security in the cloud, delivering security from the cloud, and all things at the intersection of security and cloud. Of course, we will also cover what we are doing in Google Cloud to help keep our users' data safe and workloads secure. We're going to do our best to avoid security theater, and cut to the heart of real security questions and issues. Expect us to question threat models and ask if something is done for the data subject's benefit or just for organizational benefit. We hope you'll join us if you're interested in where technology overlaps with process and bumps up against organizational design. We're hoping to attract listeners who are happy to hear conventional wisdom questioned, and who are curious about what lessons we can and can't keep as the world moves from on-premises computing to cloud computing.

Recent Episodes

EP270 The Convenience Tax: Why We Keep Failing at Supply Chain Security
APR 6, 2026
EP270 The Convenience Tax: Why We Keep Failing at Supply Chain Security
Guest: Dan Lorenc, Founder / CEO, Chainguard Topics: We just saw a security tool (Trivy) get used to pop an AI infrastructure tool (LiteLLM) to eventually pop end users. Have we reached the point where our security tooling is actually our largest unmanaged attack surface? Why now? Software supply chain security had the perennial vibe of "not top concern" for most organizations, right? TeamPCP pushed malicious code to existing GitHub tags. We've been screaming about pinning versions to SHAs for years, but clearly, nobody is listening. Is it time to admit that 'convenience' is the primary enemy of supply chain security? The Axios incident showed a victim compromised in under two minutes. In a world of auto-updating dependencies, is the concept of a human-in-the-loop for software updates officially dead, or do we need to look very hard at version pinning and such? With XZ Utils case, we saw a long-game social engineering attack. Beyond just 'watching npm closely,' what are the realistic architectural safeguards for an org that knows they can't audit every line of an update? We've spent the last three years talking about SBOMs (Software Bill of Materials) like they were a pill for supply chain health. But if the scanner producing the SBOM is the one that's compromised, isn't the SBOM just a signed receipt for your own house being on fire? What is the one practical thing they can do to ensure their CI/CD isn't a credential-exfiltration-as-a-service platform? Resources: Video version North Korea-Nexus Threat Actor Compromises Widely Used Axios NPM Package in Supply Chain Attack EP100 2022 Accelerate State of DevOps Report and Software Supply Chain Security EP116 SBOMs: A Step Towards a More Secure Software Supply Chain EP226 AI Supply Chain Security: Old Lessons, New Poisons, and Agentic Dreams EP24 Linking Up The Pieces: Software Supply Chain Security at Google and Beyond Matt Levine blog
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27 MIN