Conversations on Strategy Podcast

In this episode, Antulio J. Echevarria II discusses how NATO might better leverage risk to strengthen the alliance’s extended deterrence. Can NATO increase the risks and costs of war for an adversary without unduly raising the alliance’s own? Can the alliance strengthen the credibility of NATO’s extended deterrence through a proxy strategy of “waging war without going to war”?  Keywords: risk-benefit models, cost-benefit models, military risk, political risk, Russian deterrence, risk aversion, self-deterrence, deterrence by denial, deterrence by punishment, proxy warfareStephanie Crider (Host)You are listening to Conversations on Strategy. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.I’m in the studio with Professor Antulio J. Echevarria II.Echevarria is currently a professor of strategy at the US Army War College and the editor in chief of the US Army War College Press, which includes Parameters. He’s held the General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Research and the Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies and is the author of six books on military strategy.He’s the author of Weaponizing Risk: Calibrating Western Deterrence, which was published by the US Army War College Press in July 2025.Welcome to Conversations on Strategy, Dr. Echevarria.Antulio J. Echevarria IIThank you. I’m pleased to be here.HostI’d like to start with understanding risk in strategic thinking. You introduce the idea of weaponizing risk. Please explain how risk-benefit models differ from traditional cost-benefit approaches.EchevarriaTraditionally, cost-benefit models are designed to persuade an adversary, an aggressor, [or] potential aggressor, that the costs of a particular action are going to outweigh its benefits. The problem has always been that we don’t necessarily know where the cost ceiling is for that adversary, so we don’t know how far we have to go in order to dissuade them from doing the action we don’t want them to take. And the other problem is we don’t really know how much they value that particular object or piece of territory that they might be after.We do the best we can with our intelligence analysis, and we develop a model that we hope will work. Where, opposed to risk-based deterrence models, risk-benefit models actually allow us to go right at the heart of what an aggressor regime values most, which is its political survival. So, we step back, look at the calculations and, instead of trying to drive up costs in terms of economics or military materiel destroyed and personnel loss, we look at what about this particular situation will pose a direct threat to the regime and its political survival.Although every regime has a cost ceiling—Putin, for instance, certainly does, but it may be a lot higher [than we expected], as we have seen in recent times—the Russian cost ceiling is much higher than it is for the West and certainly for Ukraine. So, we need a method to get around just a basic cost-benefit approach. So, the risk-benefit approach does help us do that because we have to answer our own question, which is: Are the costs we are about to impose, or threatening to impose, really going to get at the heart of what the regime actually cares about? If so, how long will it take?HostI’m glad you brought up Putin and Russia.

Commander of the Canadian Army Lieutenant General Michael C. Wright discusses the Canadian Army, modernization, Ukraine, technology, and more. Listen in for insights about the Canadian Army, its mission, its future, and how America’s neighbor to the north partners with the United States.  Keywords: Canada, Arctic, Canadian Army, technology, modernization Stephanie Crider (Host)You are listening to Conversations on Strategy. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.Lieutenant General Michael C. Wright, commander of the Canadian Army, is joining me remotely today. Wright enrolled in the Canadian Armed Forces in 1990 as an infantry officer. He has commanded from platoon to brigade and Joint task force levels. He served in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and the Middle East, as well as in Canada. On promotion to Lieutenant General in July 2024, he was appointed as the commander of the Canadian Army.Welcome to Conversations on Strategy, sir. Thank you for joining me.Lieutenant General Michael C. WrightStephanie, thanks very much for the invitation. [I am] really looking forward to this.HostI'd like to open our discussion with land warfare and modernization. Looking at the last three years of fighting in Ukraine, what are your most important takeaways regarding the evolution of land warfare, and how is the Canadian Army modernizing to meet this moment?WrightThanks, Stephanie.The Canadian Army, like all of our close allies, are paying very close attention to what’s happening on the battlefield in Ukraine. I think I’ll start with three key takeaways and then how it’s shaping what the Canadian Army is doing.The first one is that it has proven that Landpower absolutely matters. Landpower in terms of the conventional large-scale combat operations capability absolutely matters, which is really driving the modernization effort that we’re doing within the Canadian Army. Not only for the capabilities that we’re trying to bring in, but also for the wholesome review of our force structure that we’ve engaged in.The second one—and this is one that I actually spend a lot of time thinking about and, frankly, worrying about—is how rapidly technology is evolving on the battlefield. Just looking at drones, for example, the multiple iterations of drones, how they are used—how they’re use for reconnaissance, how they’re used for strike—has changed so many times over the past three plus years, and knowing the challenges that we have in many of our militaries in keeping up with innovation and procuring the equipment that we need in the right time frame.The third key take away is following on from that rapidly evolving technology, we certainly see the importance of precision, but I always like to remind people that it is not a binary decision between precision or mass. We actually need precision and mass because—I’ll go back to the first part—Landpower matters. And in fact, I think one of the major reasons why we’re seeing this conflict, this war, go on over three years is because that decisive Landpower has not been—certainly in the past year to year and a half—has not been able to be applied at the level that’s required to see a decisive victory by either side.HostThese are big enough challenges in the present, and I know you’re working a lot on modernization and looking into the future. Can you talk a little bit about your vision for the Canadian Army?WrightMy vision of the Canadian Army is really building upon the great work that was done by my predecessors.

This episode’s topic is A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force, with Dr. John A. Nagl and Colonel Katie Crombe. They discuss the project’s origins and its goal to extract key lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War for US military strategy. Nagl outlines the collaborative research behind the publication, while Crombe highlights strategic lessons related to US military preparedness. The conversation covers the impact of technology and the necessity of multidomain operations, emphasizing the importance of strong alliances and the need for adaptive training in anticipation of future conflicts. The authors’ insights underscore the critical need for the military to learn from current events to enhance its readiness for tomorrow’s challenges.E-mail [email protected] (mailto:[email protected]) to give feedback on this podcastKeywords: Russia-Ukraine War, strategy, military preparedness, drone warfare, cyber warfareDownload the transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Nov/14/2003583942/-1/-1/0/COS-54-CROMBE-NAGL-TRANSCRIPT.PDF (https://media.defense.gov/2024/Nov/14/2003583942/-1/-1/0/COS-54-CROMBE-NAGL-TRANSCRIPT.PDF)

LTG Ben Hodges (US Army, retired) America and the International Order In this episode, Lieutenant General Ben Hodges (US Army, retired) discusses America’s role in the international order. The podcast covers the Russia-Ukraine War and what it means for NATO, maintaining stability in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, strategic competition between China and the United States in the Indo-Pacific, the economic and technological competition between the United States and China, South America and immigration, North Korea, and more. E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcastDate recorded: August 12, 2024Keywords: Russia-Ukraine War, China, North Korea, South America, NATODownload the transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Oct/30/2003575009/-1/-1/0/COS-53-HODGES-TRANSCRIPT.PDF (https://media.defense.gov/2024/Oct/30/2003575009/-1/-1/0/COS-53-HODGES-TRANSCRIPT.PDF)

This episode delves into the concept of strategic culture and how it influences international relations, military strategy, and deterrence, particularly between the United States, China, and Russia. Dr. Scobell and Dr. Kuznar share insights from their extensive research and highlight the nuances of strategic culture in peacetime, crisis, and conflict scenarios.  Keywords: culture China, Taiwan, strategy, strategic culture  E-mail [email protected] to give feedback on this podcast.Download the transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Oct/23/2003569840/-1/-1/0/COS-52_KUZNAR_SCOBELL%20TRANSCRIPT.PDF (https://media.defense.gov/2024/Oct/23/2003569840/-1/-1/0/COS-52_KUZNAR_SCOBELL%20TRANSCRIPT.PDF)