Counter-Errorism in Diving: Applying Human Factors to Diving
Counter-Errorism in Diving: Applying Human Factors to Diving

Counter-Errorism in Diving: Applying Human Factors to Diving

Gareth Lock at The Human Diver

Overview
Episodes

Details

Human factors is a critical topic within the world of SCUBA diving, scientific diving, military diving, and commercial diving. This podcast is a mixture of interviews and 'shorts' which are audio versions of the weekly blog from The Human Diver. Each month we will look to have at least one interview and one case study discussion where we look at an event in detail and how human factors and non-technical skills contributed (or prevented) it from happening in the manner it did.

Recent Episodes

SH265: Analysis from a Human Factors Perspective - Cave Double Fatality: Calimba 2004
MAR 28, 2026
SH265: Analysis from a Human Factors Perspective - Cave Double Fatality: Calimba 2004
This episode looks at a real cave diving tragedy and uses it to explain how accidents often happen because of human thinking, not just broken rules or bad equipment. Instead of focusing on blame, it shows how choices made underwater can seem logical at the time, even when they lead to disaster. The episode explores key ideas like awareness, decision-making, teamwork, leadership, and psychological safety, and explains how stress, distraction, group pressure, and complex plans can affect how people think and act. It also highlights why good briefings, open communication, and honest debriefs matter, and why teams must feel safe to speak up and challenge decisions. The main message is that safer diving comes from understanding human behaviour, learning without blame, and building strong teams that plan well, communicate clearly, and adapt when things don’t go as expected.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/analysis-from-a-human-factors-perspective-cave-double-fatality-calimba-2004Links: Blueprint for Survival: https://nsscds.org/blueprint-for-survival/Identifying lessons and learning from them vs blame and punishment: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/blame-or-learnonline resources that have a compendium of reports on cave diving fatalities:CREER https://creer-mx.com/accident-incident-analysis/NSS-CDS https://nsscds.org/accident-analysis/IUCRR - https://iucrr.org/more/accident-analysis/incident-reports/Jenny’s blog “Incompetent and Unaware”: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/the-dunning-kruger-effect-incompetent-or-competent-and-unawareYouTube channel: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/hf-for-dummies-part-1-human-factorsTags: - english accident analysis cave diving lanny vogel
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13 MIN
SH263: The desperate need for blame
MAR 21, 2026
SH263: The desperate need for blame
This episode tells the story of a calm, well-planned dive that still ended with an unexpected case of decompression sickness, and uses it to explore how people react when things go wrong. Even when the dive was conservative, the team experienced, and everything seemed to be done “right,” a diver still became unwell — showing that not all risks can be controlled or explained. The episode looks at our natural need to find someone or something to blame after accidents, and how this search for causes often comes from fear, not facts. It explains how people try to protect their sense of safety by creating simple explanations, even when reality is uncertain and complex. The core message is that true safety in diving doesn’t come from believing we can control everything, but from accepting uncertainty, staying humble, learning from events without blame, and building resilience, awareness, and reflection into every dive.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/desperate-need-for-blameResources: Dekker, S., ’t Hart, P. (2010). Judgment and decision making in complex systems.Mezulis et al. (2004). A meta-analytic review of self-serving attribution bias.Baumeister (1999). Self-concept, self-esteem, and self-deception.Reason, J. (1990). Human Error.Dekker, S. (2014). The Field Guide to Understanding 'Human Error'.Skinner, E. (1996). A guide to constructs of control.Rotter, J. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement.Lerner, M. (1980). The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion.Hafer & Bègue (2005). The Belief in a Just World and Reactions to Innocent Victims.Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings.Jones & Harris (1967). The attribution of attitudes. Tags: English| Sense-making, Decision-making, & Psychology
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13 MIN
SH262: So what can we do? The Practical Steps/Tools for Bringing HF/NTS into Diving
MAR 18, 2026
SH262: So what can we do? The Practical Steps/Tools for Bringing HF/NTS into Diving
This episode explains how Non-Technical Skills (NTS) and Human Factors in Diving (HFiD) only work when they become part of everyday diving culture, not just a course or a checklist. Real safety comes from how divers think, communicate, make decisions, and work as teams, not just from technical skills or equipment. It highlights the importance of shared language, reducing hierarchy, encouraging people to speak up, honest debriefs, and creating psychological safety so divers feel comfortable asking questions and raising concerns. For teams and dive centres, this means building strong technical foundations, teaching communication and decision-making skills, talking openly about risk versus reward, and making reflection and learning part of daily practice. The key message is that safer diving comes from habits, culture, and behaviour over time — not one-off training — where teams learn together, support each other, and keep working to be better than yesterday.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-practical-ways-of-bringing-hf-nts-into-divingLinks: Last weeks blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/would-you-speak-up-to-the-commanderBehavioural Marker SchemeBuilding psychological safety blogs: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/team-building-psych-safety-1Nic Emery’s blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/what-are-we-pretending-not-to-knowDEBrIEF framework: https://www.thehumandiver.com/debriefTags: English| Operations & Procedures
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14 MIN
SH261: “Would you speak up to the Commander?” - “No. They already know” - Making changes to your team's diving
MAR 14, 2026
SH261: “Would you speak up to the Commander?” - “No. They already know” - Making changes to your team's diving
This episode explores why real learning in diving is harder than buying new gear or following checklists. It explains how divers, like firefighters and oil and gas workers, often struggle to change habits, question tradition, and speak up in teams, even when something feels wrong. The problem isn’t a lack of training or information, but culture — things like hierarchy, fear of blame, and not feeling safe to challenge more experienced people. The key message is that safer diving doesn’t come from more equipment or more rules, but from better communication, shared learning, honest debriefs, and strong non-technical skills like teamwork, awareness, and decision-making. Real change only happens when these behaviours become everyday habits, not one-off courses, and when teams create an environment where people feel safe to learn, ask questions, and improve together.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/would-you-speak-up-to-the-commanderLinks: If Only… documentary and workbook: https://www.thehumandiver.com/ifonly2026 HFiD: Conference: https://www.hf-in-diving-conference.com/Nic’s blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/what-are-we-pretending-not-to-knowScuba Adventures, TX: https://www.scubaplano.com/TekDeep Asia: https://tekdeep.com/author/marccrane/Part 2: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/the-practical-ways-of-bringing-hf-nts-into-divingTags: English| Operations & Procedures
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13 MIN