China Global

In today's episode, we'll examine China’s ambitions in the Arctic and the growing importance of Sino-Russian cooperation in the region. The Arctic is undergoing profound change. Climate change is reducing sea ice coverage, creating new opportunities for shipping, resource extraction, infrastructure development, and military activity. Russia views the Arctic as central to its economic future and national security. China doesn’t border the Arctic, but it is a permanent observer in the Arctic Council and has increasingly sought a role in Arctic governance, scientific research, shipping, and energy development. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has transformed Moscow's relationships with both Western countries and Beijing, raising new questions about the future of Arctic cooperation and competition. How aligned are Chinese and Russian interests in the region? What are the prospects for commercial development along the Northern Sea Route and elsewhere in the Arctic? And what challenges and opportunities do these developments present for the United States and its allies? To help us understand these issues, we're joined by Elizabeth Wishnick, Senior Research Scientist in China Studies at CNA and Distinguished Fellow at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University. She is one of the leading experts on China's Arctic policy, Sino-Russian relations, and the geopolitical implications of a changing Arctic.

Expectations for the 3rd Trump-Xi summit since Trump returned to power were modest, and the meeting delivered limited concrete outcomes: a two-month extension of the trade war truce, lower tariffs on some US and Chinese goods, an agreement to talk more about AI risks, two pandas for the Atlanta zoo, and a potential MOU between the US and Chinese militaries on crisis prevention and management. As I wrote in an analysis of the summit, Xi Jinping came away with a larger diplomatic and strategic win. He was greeted personally by President Trump upon arrival at Andrews Air Force Base and hosted for a lavish White House dinner. Those optics can be displayed to the domestic Chinese audience as evidence that China is now a peer of the United States, and its leader Xi is a peer of the US president, Donald Trump. Summits are rare opportunities to advance policy agendas, and this meeting fell short. The two leaders reportedly talked for about 90 minutes with consecutive interpretation. In my view, the leaders of the world’s two largest economies failed to seize the opportunity to discuss how to address bilateral, regional and global challenges: AI risks, technology competition, Taiwan, China’s rare earth exports, and the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. The result was a summit that preserved the fragile stability in the US-China relationship without addressing the broader challenges that make it so consequential. On today’s episode, we’ll talk to a renowned Chinese scholar about his perspective on the summit and where U.S.-China relations may be headed next. I'm pleased to welcome Dr. Da Wei, Director of the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University and one of China's leading scholars on U.S.-China relations.

Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, Chinese foreign policy has become significantly more assertive. More than a decade ago, Xi moved away from Deng Xiaoping's approach of "hiding capabilities and biding time" and embraced what he calls “great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.” Since then, China has adopted a more assertive presence on the world stage, placed greater emphasis on relations with the Global South, taken a tougher approach toward Taiwan, and reorganized its foreign policy apparatus around Xi’s personal leadership and priorities. Understanding this transformation – and more fundamentally, understanding what Beijing wants – has become a central question for China-watchers and policy makers. What are China’s ambitions as it emerges as a global superpower? A new book offers an answer that differs in important ways from many previous analyses. The book is titled “China's Global Strategy Under Xi Jinping.” Its co-authors are Steve Tsang, Professor of China Studies and Director of the China Institute of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London and Olivia Cheung, a Lecturer in Politics at King’s College London. On this episode, we have Steve Tsang with us today to discuss the book, his assessment of China’s global ambitions under Xi Jinping, and what those ambitions mean for policymakers.

Artificial intelligence is emerging as both a powerful source of competition between the United States and China and an area where the two countries may have a shared interest in reducing risk. Washington and Beijing have sharply different views about technology, national security, and governance, yet they also face some of the same potential dangers from increasingly capable AI systems—from cyberattacks and biological threats to unintended escalation and the loss of human control over critical decisions. With U.S.-China talks on AI expected to take place ahead of the Trump-Xi summit later this month, a pressing question is whether the two countries can carve out practical areas of cooperation even as they compete intensely over the technology itself. What could realistically be achieved in those talks, where do American and Chinese concerns about AI risks converge or diverge, and can the two sides keep discussions about risk reduction separate from the broader struggle over technology and export controls? To unpack those objectives and what a credible outcome might look like, we are joined by Mark MacCarthy. Mark is a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in the Governance Studies program's Center for Technology Innovation and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, where he teaches on the governance of emerging technology, AI ethics, and privacy. He is the author of Regulating Digital Industries: How Public Oversight Can Encourage Competition, Protect Privacy, and Ensure Free Speech. He also recently co-authored an article on how the US and China can cooperate to reduce urgent AI risks, which you can find on the Brookings website.

Thirty years ago, the People's Republic of China ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Since then, Beijing has frequently invoked UNCLOS to support its maritime claims and legal positions, while advancing interpretations of the Convention that many other states –but not all – reject. This June the China Institute for Marine Affairs under the Ministry of Natural Resources marked the 30-year anniversary with an extensive report providing Beijing's interpretation of UNCLOS, including its account of the 2016 arbitral award that found China’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea as lacking a legal basis under the Convention. To examine the PRC’s evolving interpretation of UNCLOS and Chinese maritime activities, and how both are being used to advance Chinese interests, I’m joined today by Dr. Peter Dutton. Peter is a Senior Research Scholar in law and senior fellow in the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale Law School. Previously, he held several positions at the U.S. Naval War College, including as director of the China Maritime Studies Institute. He served in the US Navy for more than 40 years in several capacities, including as a Judge Advocate and naval flight officer.